GM1 UAS.SPEC.050(1)(h) Responsibilities of the UAS Operator

CAA ORS9 Decision No. 16

A POSSIBLE FAILURE WILL NOT LEAD THE UAS TO FLY OUTSIDE THE OPERATIONAL VOLUME

In order to identify whether a possible failure may lead the UA to fly outside the operational volume, a detailed description of the volume is necessary for each flight.

· Applications for OAs covering only specific locations should include the following information within the application.

· Applications for OAs which are not limited to a specific location should include suitable procedures to identify and record the following information, within the application. The operational volume should be described in the following way:

The Flight Volume should encompass the entire operation, with sufficient buffer for any operational movement around the flight path, due to navigational errors, expected weather conditions and any other reason for deviating from the flight path.

The Contingency Volume provides a buffer around the Flight Volume. If the UA leaves the Flight Volume and enters the Contingency Volume, then the contingency procedures, documented in the OM, must be activated. The exact procedures will depend on the nature of the operation but should result in the UA re-entering the Flight Volume. Excursions from the Flight Volume may result from unexpected weather conditions, avoidance manoeuvres from weather, other airspace users or other such reasons. The Contingency Volume should be sufficiently large to accommodate any excursion due to weather, with enough room to manoeuvre the UA back into the Flight Volume. The Flight Volume and the Contingency Volume make up the Operational Volume.

Should the contingency mitigations fail, the UA might leave the Operational Volume and enter the Emergency Buffer. Upon such an excursion, the Emergency Response Plan, detailed within the OM, should be executed. This may include terminating the operation safely, with the flight termination device and alerting ATC, the Police and reporting the accident to the CAA.

The UAS Operator should describe the proposed area(s) of operation, using relevant, up to date and suitable maps and diagrams, with photographs if necessary. This should also include details of any relevant airspace.

The accuracy of any maps used must be verified, and preferably from an authoritative cartographic source, such as Ordnance Survey.

Where appropriate, aeronautical charts must be sourced and used.

This may be a brief description and should include information such as:

(a) Type of area – congested (urban), building sites, open countryside (rural), road, marine environment (offshore), airport etc.;

(b) Geographic location;

(c) Population density;

(d) Features considered important to the operation(s) – roads, railways, tall obstacles and surrounding terrain;

(e) Any operation at an aerodrome can be supported with relevant aeronautical information and charts, sourced from the AIP;

(f) Any relevant airspace restrictions may be described using information from the AIP;

Simplistic descriptions such as, ‘all of the UK’ or ‘as clients request’, are not suitable operating area definitions, if not supported by suitable other conditions and limitations and information as described in points (a) to (f) above.

Individual sites do not necessarily need to be listed, if the description of the information above is adequate, and supporting procedures within the OM are provided.

The UAS Operator should, as part of the risk assessment process, identify how the operational and technical factors may lead to a delay between the RP commanding a control response, and the UA responding accordingly. This includes the following steps, that the UAS Operator should consider.

These steps are affected by multiple factors, such as HMI considerations, decision taking time, time taken to action a response, latency, and time taken to execute the command.

This time should be used to estimate the overall time taken between identifying the need to manoeuvre the aircraft, and the aircraft manoeuvring. This should be used when considering the operational volume, and the likelihood of the UA leaving it.

SAFETY SYSTEMS

Several modern commercially available UAS are fitted with safety systems as standard such as, GNSS position monitoring systems, which can aid navigation but also enable electronic safety measures. These include geo-fencing or geo-caging, automated return to home, controlled descents, hovering and automatic landing. Other safety systems are available including propeller guards, flight termination functions, tethering systems, airbags and an automatic parachute recovery system which, on detecting a problem prevent the propellors from turning (by either switching the power off or blocking them) and deploys a recovery parachute.

The UAS Operator should consider the use of any safety systems on a UA that could substantially reduce the risk to other aircraft and the public. Whilst the incorporation of such safety systems is not mandated their inclusion may be a significant factor in assuring appropriate levels of safety in the event of an UAS malfunction.

A number of different safety systems may be used to help meet this requirement.

The UAS Operator should explain, within the OM, any systems fitted to the UA or command unit that contribute to safe handling or recovery of the UA in the event of loss of control or situational awareness.

If independent ‘kill switches’ are relied on as safety risk mitigations, these must be fully described.

Use of schematic diagrams may help describe the system layout and how this is constructed.

The UAS Operator should include any manufacturer supplied data relating to equipment or components included in the system i.e. data sheets, specification sheets, performance data etc.