AMC1 ORO.FC.230 Recurrent training and checking    

CAA ORS9 Decision No. 1

RECURRENT TRAINING SYLLABUS

(a) Recurrent training

Recurrent training should comprise the following:

    (1) Ground training

      (i) The ground training programme should include:

        (A) aircraft systems;

        (B) operational procedures and requirements, including ground de-icing/anti- icing and pilot incapacitation; and

        (C) accident/incident and occurrence review.

      (ii) Knowledge of the ground training should be verified by a questionnaire or other suitable methods.

      (iii) When the ground training is conducted within 3 calendar months prior to the expiry of the 12 calendar months period, the next ground and refresher training should be completed within 12 calendar months of the original expiry date of the previous training.

    (2) Emergency and safety equipment training

      (i) Emergency and safety equipment training may be combined with emergency and safety equipment checking and should be conducted in an aircraft or a suitable alternative training device.

      (ii) Every year the emergency and safety equipment training programme should include the following:

        (A) actual donning of a life-jacket, where fitted;

        (B) actual donning of protective breathing equipment, where fitted;

        (C) actual handling of fire extinguishers of the type used;

        (D) instruction on the location and use of all emergency and safety equipment carried on the aircraft;

        (E) instruction on the location and use of all types of exits;

        (F) security procedures.

      (iii) Every 3 years the programme of training should include the following:

        (A) actual operation of all types of exits;

        (B) demonstration of the method used to operate a slide where fitted;

        (C) actual fire-fighting using equipment representative of that carried in the aircraft on an actual or simulated fire except that, with Halon extinguishers, an alternative extinguisher may be used;

        (D) the effects of smoke in an enclosed area and actual use of all relevant equipment in a simulated smoke-filled environment;

        (E) actual handling of pyrotechnics, real or simulated, where applicable;

        (F) demonstration in the use of the life-rafts where fitted. In the case of helicopters involved in extended over water operations, demonstration and use of the life-rafts.

        Helicopter water survival training

        Where life-rafts are fitted for helicopter extended overwater operations (such as sea pilot transfer, offshore operations, regular, or scheduled, coast- to-coast overwater operations), a comprehensive wet drill to cover all ditching procedures should be practised by aircraft crew. This wet drill should include, as appropriate, practice of the actual donning and inflation of a life-jacket, together with a demonstration or audio-visual presentation of the inflation of life-rafts. Crews should board the same (or similar) life- rafts from the water whilst wearing a life-jacket. Training should include the use of all survival equipment carried on board life-rafts and any additional survival equipment carried separately on board the aircraft;

          — consideration should be given to the provision of further specialist training such as underwater escape training. Where operations are predominately conducted offshore, operators should conduct 3- yearly helicopter underwater escape training at an appropriate facility;

          — wet practice drill should always be given in initial training unless the crew member concerned has received similar training provided by another operator;

        (G) particularly in the case where no cabin crew is required, first-aid, appropriate to the aircraft type, the kind of operation and crew complement.

      (iv) The successful resolution of aircraft emergencies requires interaction between flight crew and cabin/technical crew and emphasis should be placed on the importance of effective coordination and two-way communication between all crew members in various emergency situations.

      (v) Emergency and safety equipment training should include joint practice in aircraft evacuations so that all who are involved are aware of the duties other crew members should perform. When such practice is not possible, combined flight crew and cabin/technical crew training should include joint discussion of emergency scenarios.

      (vi) Emergency and safety equipment training should, as far as practicable, take place in conjunction with cabin/technical crew undergoing similar training with emphasis on coordinated procedures and two-way communication between the flight crew compartment and the cabin.

    (3) CRM

    Elements of CRM training, as specified in Table 1 of AMC1 ORO.FC.115, should be integrated into all appropriate phases of recurrent training.

    (4) Aircraft/FSTD training

      (i) General

        (A) The aircraft/FSTD training programme should be established in a way that all major failures of aircraft systems and associated procedures will have been covered in the preceding 3 year period.

        (B) When engine-out manoeuvres are carried out in an aircraft, the engine failure should be simulated.

        (C) Aircraft/FSTD training may be combined with the operator proficiency check.

        (D) When the aircraft/FSTD training is conducted within 3 calendar months prior to the expiry of the 12 calendar months period, the next aircraft/FSTD training should be completed within 12 calendar months of the original expiry date of the previous training.

      (ii) Helicopters

        (A) Where a suitable FSTD is available, it should be used for the aircraft/FSTD training programme. If the operator is able to demonstrate, on the basis of a compliance and risk assessment, that using an aircraft for this training provides equivalent standards of training with safety levels similar to those achieved using an FSTD, the aircraft may be used for this training to the extent necessary.

        (B) The recurrent training should include the following additional items, which should be completed in an FSTD:

          — settling with power and vortex ring;

          — loss of tail rotor effectiveness.

    (5) For operations with other-than-complex motor-powered aeroplanes, all training and checking should be relevant to the type of operation and class of aeroplane on which the flight crew member operates with due account taken of any specialised equipment used.

(b) Recurrent checking

Recurrent checking should comprise the following:

    (1) Operator proficiency checks

      (i) Aeroplanes

      Where applicable, operator proficiency checks should include the following manoeuvres as pilot flying:

        (A) rejected take-off when an FSTD is available to represent that specific aeroplane, otherwise touch drills only;

        (B) take-off with engine failure between V1 and V2 (take-off safety speed) or, if carried out in an aeroplane, at a safe speed above V2;

        (C) 3D approach operation to minima with, in the case of multi-engine aeroplanes, one-engine-inoperative;

        (D) 2D approach operation to minima;

        (E) at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be an RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH operation;

        (F) missed approach on instruments from minima with, in the case of multi- engined aeroplanes, one-engine-inoperative;

        (G) landing with one-engine-inoperative. For single-engine aeroplanes a practice forced landing is required.

      (ii) Helicopters

        (A) Where applicable, operator proficiency checks should include the following abnormal/emergency procedures:

          — engine fire;

          — fuselage fire;

          — emergency operation of under carriage;

          — fuel dumping;

          — engine failure and relight;

          — hydraulic failure;

          — electrical failure;

          — engine failure during take-off before decision point;

          — engine failure during take-off after decision point;

          — engine failure during landing before decision point;

          — engine failure during landing after decision point;

          — flight and engine control system malfunctions;

          — recovery from unusual attitudes;

          — landing with one or more engine(s) inoperative;

          — instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) autorotation techniques;

          — autorotation to a designated area;

          — pilot incapacitation;

          — directional control failures and malfunctions.

        (B) For pilots required to engage in IFR operations, proficiency checks include the following additional abnormal/emergency procedures:

          — 3D approach operation to minima;

          — go-around on instruments from minima with, in the case of multi- engined helicopters, a simulated failure of one engine;

          — 2D approach operation to minima;

          — at least one of the 3D or 2D approach operations should be an RNP APCH or RNP AR APCH operation;

          — in the case of multi-engined helicopters, a simulated failure of one engine to be included in either the 3D or 2D approach operation to minima;

          — landing with a simulated failure of one or more engines;

          — where appropriate to the helicopter type, approach with flight control system/flight director system malfunctions, flight instrument and navigation equipment failures.

        (C) Before a flight crew member without a valid instrument rating is allowed to operate in VMC at night, he/she should be required to undergo a proficiency check at night. Thereafter, each second proficiency check should be conducted at night.

      (iii) Once every 12 months the checks prescribed in (b)(1)(ii)(A) may be combined with the proficiency check for revalidation or renewal of the aircraft type rating.

      (iv) Operator proficiency checks should be conducted by a type rating examiner (TRE) or a synthetic flight examiner (SFE), as applicable.

    (2) Emergency and safety equipment checks

    The items to be checked should be those for which training has been carried out in accordance with (a)(2).

    (3) Line checks

      (i) Line checks should establish the ability to perform satisfactorily a complete line operation, including pre-flight and post-flight procedures and use of the equipment provided, as specified in the operations manual. The route chosen should be such as to give adequate representation of the scope of a pilot’s normal operations. When weather conditions preclude a manual landing, an automatic landing is acceptable. The commander, or any pilot who may be required to relieve the commander, should also demonstrate his/her ability to ‘manage’ the operation and take appropriate command decisions.

      (ii) The flight crew should be assessed on their CRM skills in accordance with the methodology described in AMC1 ORO.FC.115 and as specified in the operations manual.

      (iii) CRM assessment should not be used as a reason for a failure of the line check, unless the observed behaviour could lead to an unacceptable reduction in safety margin.

      (iv) When pilots are assigned duties as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, they should be checked in both functions.

      (v) Line checks should be conducted by a commander nominated by the operator. The operator should inform the CAA about the persons nominated. The person conducting the line check should occupy an observer’s seat where installed. His/her CRM assessments should solely be based on observations made during the initial briefing, cabin briefing, flight crew compartment briefing and those phases where he/she occupies the observer’s seat.

        (A) For aeroplanes, in the case of long haul operations where additional operating flight crew are carried, the person may fulfil the function of a cruise relief pilot and should not occupy either pilot’s seat during take-off, departure, initial cruise, descent, approach and landing.

      (vi) Where a pilot is required to operate as pilot flying and pilot monitoring, he/she should be checked on one flight sector as pilot flying and on another flight sector as pilot monitoring. However, where the operator’s procedures require integrated flight preparation, integrated cockpit initialisation and that each pilot performs both flying and monitoring duties on the same sector, then the line check may be performed on a single flight sector.

    (4) When the operator proficiency check, line check or emergency and safety equipment check are undertaken within the final 3 calendar months of validity of a previous check, the period of validity of the subsequent check should be counted from the expiry date of the previous check.

    (5) In the case of single-pilot operations with helicopters, the recurrent checks referred to in (b)(1), (2) and (3) should be performed in the single-pilot role on a particular helicopter type in an environment representative of the operation.

(c) Flight crew incapacitation training, except single-pilot operations

    (1) Procedures should be established to train flight crew to recognise and handle flight crew incapacitation. This training should be conducted every year and can form part of other recurrent training. It should take the form of classroom instruction, discussion, audio- visual presentation or other similar means.

    (2) If an FSTD is available for the type of aircraft operated, practical training on flight crew incapacitation should be carried out at intervals not exceeding 3 years.

(d) Personnel providing training and checking

Training and checking should be provided by the following personnel:

    (1) ground and refresher training by suitably qualified personnel;

    (2) flight training by a flight instructor (FI), type rating instructor (TRI) or class rating instructor (CRI) or, in the case of the FSTD content, a synthetic flight instructor (SFI), providing that the FI, TRI, CRI or SFI satisfies the operator's experience and knowledge requirements sufficient to instruct on the items specified in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)(A) and (B);

    (3) emergency and safety equipment training by suitably qualified personnel;

    (4) CRM:

      (i) integration of CRM elements into all the phases of the recurrent training by all the personnel conducting recurrent training. The operator should ensure that all personnel conducting recurrent training are suitably qualified to integrate elements of CRM into this training;

      (ii) classroom CRM training by at least one CRM trainer, qualified as specified in AMC3 ORO.FC.115 who may be assisted by experts in order to address specific areas.

    (5) recurrent checking by the following personnel:

      (i) operator proficiency check by a type rating examiner (TRE), class rating examiner (CRE) or, if the check is conducted in an FSTD, a TRE, CRE or a synthetic flight examiner (SFE), trained in CRM concepts and the assessment of CRM skills.

      (ii) emergency and safety equipment checking by suitably qualified personnel.

(e) Use of FSTD

    (1) Training and checking provide an opportunity to practice abnormal/emergency procedures that rarely arise in normal operations and should be part of a structured programme of recurrent training. This should be carried out in an FSTD whenever possible.

    (2) The line check should be performed in the aircraft. All other training and checking should be performed in an FSTD, or, if it is not reasonably practicable to gain access to such devices, in an aircraft of the same type or in the case of emergency and safety equipment training, in a representative training device. The type of equipment used for training and checking should be representative of the instrumentation, equipment and layout of the aircraft type operated by the flight crew member.

    (3) Because of the unacceptable risk when simulating emergencies such as engine failure, icing problems, certain types of engine(s) (e.g. during continued take-off or go-around, total hydraulic failure), or because of environmental considerations associated with some emergencies (e.g. fuel dumping) these emergencies should preferably be covered in an FSTD. If no FSTD is available, these emergencies may be covered in the aircraft using a safe airborne simulation, bearing in mind the effect of any subsequent failure, and the exercise must be preceded by a comprehensive briefing.